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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is the 
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and Western Balkan regions and the 
analysis of the effects of aggregate currency 
misbalances on particular countries’ risk 
of default.  The empirical tests provided 
confirm the positive effect of currency 
mismatch on default risk, which is reflected 
in the behaviour of yield spreads on the 
government bonds of the countries under 
consideration. The higher the negative 
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EMBI spreads appear to be, and vice versa.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF CURRENCY 
MISMATCH ON A COUNTRY’S DEFAULT RISK1. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this paper is the problem of currency mismatch in emerging and 
frontier markets. The central part of the paper is devoted to analysis and 
measurement of currency mismatch and to the repercussions of that imbalance 
on the size of the relevant risks and financing costs in developing countries. 
Currency mismatch occurs when liabilities of the whole country or a single 
sector are denominated in foreign currencies, while inflows of funds are 
predominantly expressed in local currency (Goldstein and Turner, 2004). 
Currency mismatch increases financial instability and the probability of debt 
crisis or crisis in the banking sector. In a significant number of developing 
countries public debt is predominantly linked to foreign currencies, while state 
revenues are based on domestic production and linked to the local currency. 
This configuration of public but also private debt causes a currency mismatch in 
the country’s balance sheet, while making fiscal sustainability sensitive to 
exchange rate changes. 
The sudden depreciation of a national currency can have different possible 
effects on the local economy: a contractionary effect (through increase in the 
amount of real debt and the probality of default) and an expansionary effect 
(through increase in exports, improvement of balance of payments, and 
reduction of default risk). Which of these two opposing effects will predominate 
in a particular case depends largely on the degree of currency mismatch, the 
amount and maturity of the public debt and external debt of a given country, 
the exchange rate regime, the degree of local market openness and opportunities 
for exports increase, and the balance of payments situation. Depreciation causes 
expansion in developed low-indebted countries, which can easily enter 
international markets with their own goods and services. In less developed 
financially weaker countries that do not possess the above-mentioned features, 
the depreciation has a contractionary effect. Depreciation reduces the ability of 
foreign-currency-denominated debt servicing. It causes conversion of currency 
risk into credit risk (Božović, Urošević and Živković, 2009). The costs of capital 
and debt increase, while insignificant benefits are realized on the export side. 
These effects can be especially amplified in dual currency systems (a situation 
which is present in Serbia) where there is a pronounced pass-through effect of 
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creating new depreciation pressures. 
2. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
The currency crisis during the 1990s brought to light the weaknesses of 
developing countries and their sensitivity to global financial markets and 
economic changes at the international level. In particular, the Asian crisis in 
1997 prompted economists to create new models to describe the origin and 
development of modern financial crises. These crisis models pay more attention 
to the weaknesses of vulnerable countries’ private and banking sectors, and 
focus on balance sheet imbalances of both particular entities and whole 
economies. The main feature of these models is the attempt to identify a 
number of factors that can potentially lead to crises, such as high indebtedness 
and the resulting moral hazard problem, banking panic, insolvency of banks and 
companies, and price bubbles in financial and real asset markets. These models 
also emphasize the importance of a country’s external liabilities in foreign 
currency as one of the main causes of crisis in the case of depreciation of the 
domestic currency. High external debt in a foreign currency in a situation of real 
depreciation of the domestic currency makes it difficult to service the debt. 
Developed primarily by Krugman (1999), followed by Céspedes, Chang and 
Velasco (2000, 2004), and Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001, 2004), among 
others, ‘third generation’ crisis models introduce the terminology of currency 
mismatch to highlight the sensitivity of an economy to exchange rate changes in 
a situation of inadequate balance sheet structure. The accumulation of external 
liabilities in foreign currencies, in a situation where the assets and income of the 
country and individual sectors of the economy are denominated in local 
currency, results in financial weaknesses, which by themselves can induce 
investors' expectations of domestic currency depreciation. 
The presence of external liabilities denominated in foreign currencies on the 
balance sheet is not by itself the cause of a country’s financial fragility. In order 
to assess the level of risk the value of assets denominated in foreign currency 
must be taken into account, because they provide protection against the 
currency and consequently against default risk (Rosenberg, Halikias, House, 
Keller, Nystedt, Pitt and Setser, 2004). In addition to analyses of external assets 
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taken into consideration.  
In this paper the main identified causes of currency and financial crises in these 
models will be observed, with special emphasis on balance sheet imbalances of 
total economies and their individual sectors - the government, the central bank, 
the banking sector and other financial institutions, the corporate sector, and the 
household sector. Balance sheet imbalances include primarily currency and 
maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities. Our analysis focuses on the impact 
of currency mismatches, reflected in the balance sheets of developing countries, 
on the risk of default. Besides the main causes identified in the new models, 
macroeconomic parameters analyzed in previous generation models will be 
taken into account (Dornbusch, 2001). 
By including measures of aggregate currency mismatch, debt sustainability 
analysis should become more complete, with better predictive capabilities. 
Aggregate indicators of domestic and external currency mismatch provide a 
more accurate picture of the possible effects of the depreciation of domestic 
currency on the ability to service debt and the increase of default risk. In such 
circumstances the monetary authorities lose credibility and public confidence, 
which reduces their maneuverability. With the increase of uncertainty in the 
system the probability of a country defaulting increases, which leads to a 
widening of yield spreads on its debt securities. 
More precisely, the financial vulnerability of developing countries can be 
measured by the movement of yield spreads on government bonds issued on the 
Eurobond market, relative to the ‘risk-free’ benchmark bond with the same 
characteristics (maturity, currency denomination) issued by a developed 
country. The spread is formed in the process of trading these bonds in the 
secondary market and it changes in accordance with changes in market 
sentiment regarding the financial strength or weakness of the developing 
country. Edwards (1984) finds that spread levels are a function of the debtor’s 
probability of default on its external obligations. In circumstances of increased 
uncertainty investors see rising default probabilities, resulting in an increase in 
yield spreads on issued government bonds (Diamond, 1989). Risk premiums on 
bonds should compensate investors for credit, market, and liquidity risk. 
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developing countries can gain access to international financial markets. Ferrucci 
(2003) states that yield spreads in developing countries can be used as a measure 
of a country’s default risk and to assess the potential of external financing. 
Yield spreads on government bonds in developing countries reflect investors' 
perception of the probability of default, and are negatively associated with the 
sustainability of, primarily, countries’ external debt. The equilibrium models of 
yield spread behaviour in developing countries specify the factors that define 
this probability and connect them to the behaviour of spreads. External debt 
sustainability means that the debtor country is solvent, i.e., able to meet its long-
term liabilities, as well as liquid, or able to refinance the debt due in the short 
term. Debt sustainability defines a country’s level of financial vulnerability. The 
yield spread behaviour of developing and developed countries’ bonds, therefore, 
is a function of the probability of default (and the magnitude of the loss in the 
case of default) that is associated with the sustainability of external debt, which 
we will measure by using individual indicators of liquidity and solvency 
(Ferrucci, 2003). 
In this paper we start from the model that explains the behaviour of yield 
spreads, developed in its basic form by Edwards (1984, 1986), and based on the 
assumption that financial markets are competitive and market agents are 
neutral to risk. 
An investor who is neutral to risk lends funds to the debtor country. The 
equilibrium condition for the optimal allocation of the investor’s funds can be 
expressed as follows: 
    
L
f r p p r      1 1 1   (2.1.) 
where  rf  denotes the risk-free interest rate at the global level, p denotes the 
probability of default by the debtor country,  the payment of the debtor to the 
investor in the case of default, while r
L stands for the rate of return on 
investment, or the rate at which the funds are borrowed.  
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generality of conclusion, express spread s between the rate of return on specific 
investment and the risk-free interest rate: 
  f f
L r
p
p
r r s 

   1
1
 (2.2.) 
Probability of default is, by convention, specified as follows: 
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where xj are explanatory variables that define the probability of default, and j 
the corresponding coefficients. 
By combining equations (2.2.) and (2.3.), and after taking the logarithm, the 
following relation is provided: 
 j
J
j
j f x r s 

  
1
1 log log   (2.4.) 
If we observe a larger number of countries i through time t, the inclusion of 
these dimensions would generate the following log-linear specification with 
fixed individual effects that we need to estimate: 
  it i jit j ft it u x r s         1 log log , where i=1, 2, ..., N; t=1, 2, ..., T   (2.5.) 
and where sit stands for yield spreads in the secondary market above the risk-
free interest rate for country i in time t, μi for fixed individual effects (specific to 
country i), and uit for random errors (independently and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.)). 
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spreads and other variables over many years, dynamic forms of panel models 
can be tested on actual data. In such circumstances it is possible that the correct 
model should, as an explanatory variable, include the value of the dependent 
variable in the previous period, which would cause inconsistent regression 
parameters’ estimates based on the fixed effects model.
1 
Besides the choice of the appropriate model specification, one of the most 
important stages in yield spread modelling is the choice of the explanatory 
variables on the basis of which the model will be specified. In the literature that 
examines this area there are various attempts to identify the key fundamental 
and external factors that could explain the change in yield spreads in developing 
countries. The first empirical analyses focus on the impact of international 
interest rates on spreads. The results do not provide strong confirmation of the 
existence of a significant correlation between these two variables (Eichengreen 
and Mody, 1998; Kamin and Von Kleist, 1999). Some recent studies find a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between short-term interest 
rates in the U.S. and yield spreads in developing countries in accordance with 
the theoretical assumptions (Arora and Cerisola, 2001; Ferrucci, 2003; Dailami, 
Masson and Padou, 2005; Hartelius, Kashiwase and Kodres, 2008). Further, 
specific fundamental factors in developing countries are analyzed that affect the 
movement of yield spreads on their debt. Through principal components 
analysis, McGuire and Schrijvers (2003) reveal the influence of common 
external factors in developing countries on the movement of risk premiums on 
their government bonds. Rowland and Torres (2004) and Rowland (2004), in 
different panel specifications, show that GDP growth and the ratios debt/GDP, 
debt/exports, foreign exchange reserves/GDP, and debt service/GDP are 
significant explanatory variables that affect the movement of yield spreads. A 
variety of performed analyses confirm the effect of numerous fundamental and 
external variables on the movement of yield spreads (Baldacci, Gupta and Mati, 
2008); Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2009).  
The attention devoted to the analysis of these factors increased significantly 
after the currency and financial crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
                                                 
1   See the analyses of the EMBI spreads determinants in the dynamic panel framework in e.g., 
Bellas, Papaioannou and Petrova (2010). 
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impact on yield spreads. While various IMF studies emphasize global liquidity 
as crucial in the formation of spreads, to date World Bank research has stressed 
as decisive the fundamental factors and their impact on spreads. 
3. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our research framework is based on a theoretical model that sees yield spreads 
as a function of the probability that a specific country will stop servicing its 
external liabilities. We first analyze the behaviour of yield spreads due to the 
effect of common macro factors showing the level of liquidity, solvency, and 
indebtedness of the specific country, together with their response to global 
financial circumstances. Then, after including the aggregate measure of 
currency mismatch for the observed countries in the sample, we test the 
relevance of this indicator as one of the determinants of the yield spreads’ 
behaviour by replacing existing debt indicators with this new measure. It is 
expected that the results will show that the aggregate indicators of currency 
imbalances are important determinants of yield spread movement for 
developing countries with emerging markets. Using this indicator should 
improve the explanatory power of the basic model. If this is confirmed, the 
indicators of currency mismatch should be used more often and in more detail 
in the analysis of imbalances in developing countries in order to more 
accurately comprehend the behaviour of the macro risks in concrete markets, 
especially sovereign risk in circumstances of significant - in this case - currency 
imbalances. 
Data analysis was carried out on the panel data set. It follows the samples of 
countries with emerging and frontier markets within predefined time horizons. 
The dependent variables in our model are the yield spreads on government 
bonds of the observed countries, formed in the secondary market. They will be 
presented by EMBI Global yield spreads, which are available as time series for a 
large number of countries. The composite index of developing countries’ 
sovereign debt is represented by the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index 
(EMBI), which can be broken down into sub-categories according to the degree 
of diversification and the liquidity of the instruments involved. These categories 
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2 as a less liquid but more 
diversified index than the EMBI +, EMBI Global Diversified as even more 
diversified than the EMBI Global index, and Euro EMBI Global as the least 
liquid subindex. These indices are formed as weighted averages of yield spreads 
on government bonds of developing countries issued on international financial 
markets. Change in EMBI spreads indicates investors’ perception of risk. We 
will try to explain the behaviour of spreads by using important macro-indicators 
of the countries’ liquidity, solvency, and indebtedness, which will serve as 
explanatory variables in the model. 
The basic model of yield spread behaviour will include the theoretically and 
empirically confirmed macro-indicators as explanatory variables. The new 
model, as we will continue to call it as opposed to the original one, will include a 
new variable: an aggregate measure of currency mismatch, which will replace 
the common variables indicating the level of indebtedness and the country’s 
ability to service the debt. This will be done in order to avoid harmful 
multicollinearity in the model which may affect the validity of conclusions 
based on the model. 
Following the earlier empirical analyses, we use explanatory variables in the 
model which are selected from the list shown in Table 1, while the expected sign 
of correlation of the specific variable with the dependent variable (EMBI 
spreads) is given in parentheses (see e.g., Prat, 2007). 
                                                 
2   The EMBI Global index tracks the returns on developing countries’ bonds that are actively 
traded and is an index of broader scope compared to the EMBI +. It includes dollar Brady 
bonds, loans, and Eurobonds with a nominal value of at least USD500 million. Unlike the 
EMBI +, which selects countries that will be included in the index basket based on their credit 
rating, EMBI Global combines per capita income classes defined by the World Bank and the 
history of debt restructuring of each individual country. This increases the number of 
countries entering the index basket. The broader basket is also a result of less strict liquidity 
requirements, resulting in this index tracking nearly double the number of instruments in 
comparison to the EMBI +. 
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External or global factors:  Liquidity factors: 
  S&P 500 Composite Index (-) 
  Interest rates in developed 
countries (the 3-month LIBOR 
(USD, EUR), the 3-month 
Treasury bills rate) (+) 
  The price of oil on the world 
market as a global indicator (Brent 
oil) (-) 
  Market liquidity indicators - swap 
spread and TED spread
3 (+) 
  The risk aversion of investors 
presented by implied volatility 
index S&P500 (VIX) (+) 
  The level of openness of the 
economy () 
  Inflation rate (+) 
  The share of exports in GDP (-) 
  The ratio of short-term external 
debt to GDP (+) 
  Debt service to GDP (+) 
  The ratio of foreign exchange 
reserves to external debt (-) 
Fundamental factors: 
  Growth of real GDP (-) 
  Balance of payments current account balance to GDP (surplus (-) / deficit 
(+)) and budgetary position to GDP (surplus (-) / deficit (+)) 
  Public debt to GDP (+) 
  The share of external debt in the value of exports (+) 
Source: Authors’ presentation based on Prat (2007) 
Disorders in broader market trends and the increasing risk aversion of investors 
cause a run in liquid assets and an increase in market yield spreads and interest 
rates (TED spread, swap spread, LIBOR). The increased probability of the 
country defaulting results in an increase in the EMBI spreads. The expected 
relationship between these external variables and the dependent variable is 
positive. It is important to note the impact of changes in the international risk-
free interest rate, which is usually represented by the rate of return on U.S. 
                                                 
3   Swap spreads represent the difference between the swap rate and the yield on the benchmark 
government security. TED spreads represent the difference between the yields on U.S. 
government securities and Eurodollar funds. 
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rate of return on a risky investment equals the risk-free interest rate plus a risk 
premium, the decline in the risk-free interest rate results in a decline in the rate 
of return on risky assets. The decline in global interest rates thus causes a 
decline in EMBI spreads. In addition, the decline in the international reference 
interest rate lowers liabilities based on variable debt and refinancing of debt, 
which has a positive effect on the solvency of developing countries. With lower 
risk of liquidity and solvency, debt appears sustainable, which, viewed from the 
perspective of market participants, lowers the probability of default and the 
yield spreads on debt securities of developing countries. Finally, the decline in 
international interest rates increases bond prices in developing countries due to 
the growth in demand for these yielding securities. This results in a drop in yield 
on risky securities and a narrowing of yield spreads. The high sensitivity of 
government bond yield spreads in developing countries compared to U.S. 
government bonds stems from the fact that these countries rely heavily on the 
U.S. dollar in foreign borrowing. Therefore, if interest rates rise in the country 
of the reserve currency, developing countries face an unfavourable debt 
position, especially if an increase in interest rates is accompanied by the 
appreciation of the dollar or other key reserve currency. In dual currency 
systems this problem is particularly acute. The growth in the value of the foreign 
currency in which the debt is denominated launches the spiral effect of 
‘exchange rate - prices - exchange rate’, resulting in a further appreciation of 
foreign currency, with negative consequences for the country’s financial 
stability, budgetary position, and economic growth. This scenario has a 
significant additional impact on the yield spreads’ widening. 
The solvency of a country indicates its ability to service its debts in the long run. 
Insolvency, as a result of inadequate structural parameters and the inherent 
economic weaknesses of a country, leads to difficulties in the fulfillment of the 
obligations that affect the perception of investors regarding the sustainability of, 
primarily, the country’s external debt. 
In the short term, the debtor country’s level of sustainability of its liquidity, or 
the ability to settle or refinance current obligations that are due for payment, is 
of crucial importance. In extreme situations liquidity risk can lead to debtor 
CURRENCY MISMATCH EFFECT ON DEFAULT RISK
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behaviour of yield spreads in developing countries. 
Finally, the level of the currency mismatch at the macro level will be presented 
by AECM and corrected AECM_COR measures, proposed by Goldstein and 
Turner (2004).  
 TD FC
XGS
NFCA
AECM %  




   (2.6.) 
If AECM  0
4 
NFCA = NFAMABK + NBKA$ - NBKL$ - IB$ (2.7.) 
DB IB DCP BKL NBKL
DB IB DCP BKL NBKL
TD FC
   
   

$ $ $ $ $
%  (2.8.) 
Where:  
NFCA = Net foreign currency assets,  
FC%TD = Foreign currency share of domestic debt in the total debt, 
XGS = Exports of goods and services, 
NFAMABK = Net foreign assets of monetary authorities and commercial banks, 
NBKA$ = Cross border assets in foreign currency of nonbanking sector at BIS 
reporting banks, 
NBKL$ = Cross border liabilities in foreign currency of nonbanking sector to 
BIS reporting banks, 
IB$ = International bonds outstanding in foreign currency, 
NBKL = Cross border liabilities in all currencies of nonbanking sector to BIS 
reporting banks, 
NBKL$ = Cross border liabilities in foreign currencies of nonbanking sector to 
BIS reporting banks, 
BKL = Cross border liabilities in all currencies of banks to BIS reporting banks, 
                                                 
4   The case of the debtor country. In the case of the creditor country the following specification 
would be used: AECM = (NFCA / MGS) x FC%TD if AECM > 0, where MGS stands for 
imports of goods and services. 
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banks, 
DCP = Domestic loans to private sector, 
DCP$ = Domestic loans to private sector in foreign currency, 
IB = International bonds outstanding in all currencies, 
DB = Domestic bonds outstanding in all currencies, 
DB$ = Domestic bonds outstanding in foreign currencies. 
In basic calculations of the presented mismatch measure it is assumed that all 
domestic bonds and loans are denominated in local currency, i.e., DB$/DB=0 
and DCP$/DCP=0.  
The corrected measure AECM_COR takes into account the nonzero share of 
the domestic foreign currency debt in total, when these data are available for a 
particular country. 
 COR TD FC
XGS
NFCA
COR AECM _ % _  




   (2.9.) 
If AECM_COR  0 
These measures show how vulnerable a country is in the case of significant 
depreciation of its currency. They take into account the currency composition 
of domestic and foreign assets and liabilities of different sectors of the economy. 
It is important to emphasize that the public sector, and the debt in foreign 
currency that it generates versus assets and income in local currency, is often the 
main generator of foreign exchange misbalances in developing countries. The 
indicators of aggregate currency mismatch show the net currency position of 
both debtor and creditor countries. If the level of negative currency mismatch of 
the debtor country is high, yield spreads on the debt of that country will grow, 
reflecting the increase in its probability of default. The reverse is the case with 
creditor countries, where the growth of positive currency misbalance leads to a 
decrease of yield spreads on its debt. 
We start with the data for 19 developing countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Western Balkans, of which 12 are classified as countries with 
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5: Albania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Croatia, FYR 
Macedonia, Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
and Russia. Data were collected on solvency, liquidity, and external factors for 
the period 2001-2012. During the selection of explanatory variables, we rely on 
the previously mentioned studies that explain the behaviour of yield spreads on 
sovereign bonds. Then we introduce in the analysis the aggregate currency 
mismatch indicator in order to test its significance in the evaluation of the 
sensitivity of developing countries, which is reflected in the movement of their 
yield spreads on sovereign debt. A description of variables and data sources, 
together with the calculated aggregate currency mismatch indicator, is provided 
in the Appendix. 
The analysis is performed on the sample of countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Western Balkans for which we have the necessary data. From 
the sample of all countries for which there is available or we have calculated the 
aggregate indicators of currency mismatches (AECM and corrected measure 
AECM_COR), we will observe those for which we also have available market 
data of yield spreads on government debt securities (EMBI spreads). In the total 
period 2001-2012 the necessary data are available for five countries (Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland, Turkey and Russia). If we consider a shorter period, starting 
from 2005, the data are available for two additional countries, Serbia and 
Ukraine. 
Initially, we observe data for five countries over a period of 12 years. Given that 
we have data for the explanatory and the dependent variables in every year, we 
have a balanced panel. 
The basic model is first evaluated using a panel regression with fixed individual 
effects (FE model). In addition to the FE model we have also estimated the FE 
model with robust standard errors, which accounts for heteroskedasticity in 
                                                 
5    See e.g., FTSE, MSCI, and S&P classifications of frontier markets. According to these 
classifications frontier markets include the following from the observed sample of 19 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans: Bulgaria, Montenegro, 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Serbia. 
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and also the correlation of errors between the observation units in the same 
period of time, we have estimated specification by the Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) method, which takes these facts into account. 
In the second stage we have estimated a new model which includes the 
aggregate measure of currency mismatch and corrected aggregate currency 
mismatch as new explanatory variables, and we have tested their explanatory 
significance. The new model is also tested for the presence of heteroskedasticity 
in random errors and the correlation of errors between the observation units in 
the same period of time. 
At this point it is important to note that the observed sample of countries is 
small for the implementation of dynamic panel model specifications and the 
observed time period is short for model estimation based on the e.g., Pooled 
Mean Group (PMG) estimation method.  
The first step in the analysis
6 is the presentation of summary descriptive 
statistics of variables and detailed display of regressors’ variations within the 
observation units across time and between observation units (countries).
7 
Table 2. Summary descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables 
Number of 
observations
Arithmetic 
mean 
Standard 
deviation
Min Max 
Number of the country  60  3 1,426148 1  5 
embi  60  260,2973 199,8906 24,1 934,35 
log_embi  60  2,288 0,3557365 1,38 2,97 
Growth rate of real GDP 60  3,637667 3,841703 -7,8  9,4 
Inflation rate  60  8,442667 9,019633 0,8  54,25 
Balance of payments 
current Account/GDP  
60  -2,880167 7,211895 -25,2 11,07 
Public debt/GDP  60  43,26317 21,32369 7,88  81,31 
                                                 
6   The analysis that follows was performed using the statistical/econometric software package 
Stata 11. 
7   Details of variation of regressors within the observation units over time and between the 
observation units is available in the Appendix. 
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99Fiscal position/GDP   60  -2,501 5,322289 -23,9  8,33 
External debt/Exports  60  138,511 34,80216 85,32  226,23 
Exports/GDP  60  45,1185 20,03306 21 94,66 
Short-term external 
debt/GDP 
60  13,11983 8,525885 3,55 38,25 
International 
reserves/External debt  
60  38,106 21,72739 15,71 99,06 
External debt 
service/GDP  
60  10,0375 5,217186 3,25 22,43 
3m LIBOR (usd)  60  2,264167 1,774974 0,34  5,3 
3m LIBOR (eur)  60  2,515833 1,350998 0,57  4,63 
3m-T-bill rate  60  1,783333 1,645056 0,05  4,73 
Sp500_vix  60  21,86583 6,510219 12,81 32,69 
Sp500  60  1186,159 157,6937 948,05 1477,18 
Brent_oil  60  64,25917 30,58699 24,42 111,97 
Aecm  60  -0,8283334 13,78823 -25 37,7 
Aecm_cor  60  -3,73 18,91845 -45,5 38 
EU member  60  0,3833333 0,4903014 0  1 
Source: Authors' calculation 
A detailed overview of descriptive statistics for EMBI spreads shows a slight 
asymmetry and a kurtosis slightly higher than normal.
8 By taking the logarithm 
of yield spreads, skewness and kurtosis decrease approaching the value 
characteristic for normal distribution. The significance (normality) test for 
coefficients of skewness and kurtosis shows that, for log-EMBI, variable 
asymmetry and kurtosis did not differ significantly from normal (p (skewness) 
= 0.1703, p (kurtosis) = 0.8766, adjusted χ2 (2) = 1.99, p> χ2 = 0.3702). By 
comparing the characteristics of these two variables we opt for log_EMBI as the 
dependent variable in the analysis, which is also the case in most of the related 
empirical analysis of yield spreads. 
In the next step we examine the correlation between the dependent and all 
potential explanatory variables. We observe weak to moderate correlation 
                                                 
8   In the Appendix. 
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log_EMBI variable. 
The selected explanatory variables and their correlation with the dependent 
variable and other explanatory variables are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Correlation of variables 
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Log_embi  1,0000   
Growth rate 
of real GDP  
-0,2856 1,0000   
Public 
debt/GDP  
0,0578 -0,1872 1,0000   
Fiscal 
position/GDP  
-0,0310 0,4366 -0,5861 1,0000   
External 
debt/Exports  
0,4550 -0,3846 0,4234 -0,5450 1,0000   
Sp500_vix  0,5019 -0,4885 0,0643 -0,2121 0,2908 1,0000   
Aecm  -0,0862 0,1621 -0,8456 0,5495 -0,5919 -0,1413 1,0000  
Aecm_cor  -0,1660 0,1891 -0,8674 0,6217 -0,6424 -0,1796 0,9613 1,0000 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
It can be observed that AECM and especially AECM_COR measures are 
significantly correlated with the variable public debt/GDP, as well as moderately 
with fiscal position/GDP and external debt/exports, so it makes sense to replace 
these variables with aggregate measures of currency mismatch in subsequent 
model specifications. The significant correlation is due to the fact that the 
aggregate measure of currency mismatch implicitly reflects all the 
aforementioned macroeconomic imbalances in a single indicator. 
After this step we approach the modelling of the logarithmic values of yield 
spreads by testing different possible explanatory variables suggested by theory 
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log_EMBI spreads by formulating a panel specification with fixed individual 
effects (and fixed effects with robust standard errors).
9 
The choice of a fixed model specification is primarily conditioned by the 
number of units of observation, i.e., the fact that we have restricted the 
conclusion-making to a specific set of several observation units (countries). This 
model is also verified on the basis of the Hausman specification test as the 
statistical criteria for choice. Besides the panel model with fixed effects, 
specification with random effects has also been tested on the same set of 
variables. The result of the Hausman test (χ
2(4) statistic = 38.29, p = 0.0000) 
indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis where the model with random 
effects provides inconsistent estimates. So, between the two aforementioned 
specifications, we choose the specification with fixed effects, whose estimation 
by ordinary least squares (with fulfilled initial assumptions) provides us with 
consistent estimates of regression parameters. Fulfillment of these assumptions 
is further tested. 
The test of individual effects confirms their significance (F(4.50) = 30.46, p > F = 
0.0000). However, despite the significant individual effects, heteroskedasticity 
may be present in random errors and the possibility of disturbed assumption 
about the correlation of errors for different observation units in the same period 
of time. 
In the next step we check whether there is a correlation of residuals between the 
observation units (countries) in the same period of time. The Breusch-Pagan 
LM test, for testing the presence of correlation between the residuals of 
observation units in the same period of time, is suitable for panels in which T is 
greater than N. According to this test, at the significance level of 5%, we reject 
                                                 
9   Regressors that were not statistically significant or that did not show the expected correlation 
with the dependent variable include Balance of payments current account/GDP and 
Exports/GDP (this may be because exports are already an integral part of the variable Balance 
of payments current account/GDP and External debt/exports), Short-term external 
debt/GDP (as short-term debt is already part of variable External debt/exports), 
Exports/GDP (because it is a part of the variable External debt/exports), 3-month LIBOR, 3-
month-T-bill rate, and the Sp500 that represents external global variables that may not be 
significant for the concrete region of the Central and Eastern Europe and Western Balkans. 
102
Economic Annals, Volume LIX, No. 201 / April – June 2014the null hypothesis according to which there is no statistically significant 
correlation between the residuals of different observation units (χ
2(10) = 21.249, 
p = 0.0194). 
We conclude that there exists a correlation between residuals of the different 
observation units, as a consequence of the common factors that influence all of 
the countries in the sample, or the fact that the counties are closely linked in 
economic terms. 
Modified Wald's test was carried out for the presence of heteroskedasticity in 
the panel specification with fixed effects. It confirmed the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the model (χ
2(5) statistic = 58.69, p = 0.0000). 
Because of the presence of correlation of residuals between the observation units 
as well as heteroskedasticity in the panel, we have tested the specification that 
takes into account these econometric problems. It is a fixed-effect specification 
estimated by the GLS method, in which we have additionally taken into account 
the correlation of residuals between the observation units and heteroskedasticity 
in the panel. A summary of different specifications estimated is given in Table 4. 
Table 4.  Estimated panel specifications for the dependent variable log_EMBI 
on a sample of five countries in the period 2001-2012 
Dependent variable 
log_EMBI 
    
 (1) 
FE model 
(2) 
FE model with 
robust standard 
errors 
(3) 
FE_GLS 
(correlation of residuals 
between observation units 
and heteroskedasticity 
taken into accoount) 
Growth rate of real 
GDP  
-0,0237** 
(0,00785) 
-0,0237 
(0,0123) 
-0,0173** 
(0,00572) 
Public debt/GDP  
0,0127*** 
(0,00178) 
0,0127* 
(0,00293) 
0,0110*** 
(0,00122) 
Fiscal position/GDP 
0,0162** 
(0,00583) 
0,0162 
(0,00763) 
0,00896* 
(0,00398) 
CURRENCY MISMATCH EFFECT ON DEFAULT RISK
103External 
debt/Exports  
0,00230* 
(0,00111) 
0,00230 
(0,000927) 
0,00263*** 
(0,000653) 
Sp500_vix 
0,0171*** 
(0,00369) 
0,0171** 
(0,00348) 
0,0164*** 
(0,00354) 
bu 
   -0,334*** 
(0,0359) 
hu 
   -0,991*** 
(0,0834) 
po 
   -0,726*** 
(0,0525) 
tu 
   -0,387*** 
(0,0720) 
const 
1,170*** 
(0,172) 
1,170*** 
(0,136) 
1,664*** 
(0,106) 
N  60 60  60 
r
2  0,762 0,762   
r
2_o  0,151 0,151   
r
2_b  0,191 0,191   
r
2_w  0,762 0,762   
sigma_u  0,395 0,395   
sigma_e  0,156 0,156   
rho  0,865 0,865   
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Notes:  
1. Standard errors in parentheses 
2. * p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001 
3. Dummy variables: 
bu (takes the value 1 for Bulgaria, and the value 0 for other countries) 
hu (takes the value 1 for Hungary, and the value 0 for other countries) 
po (takes the value 1 for Poland, and the value 0 for other countries) 
tu (takes the value 1 for Turkey, and the value 0 for other countries) 
ru (takes the value 1 for Russia, and the value 0 for other countries) 
It is important to observe that the signs in front of the estimated coefficients 
follow economic logic. 
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analyzed countries’ real GDP growth rate. A higher level of economic growth 
lowers the debtor country’s probability of default, which is reflected in the 
reactions of market participants, who then require lower yields on the debt 
securities of the countries under consideration. Therefore, higher economic 
growth should lower yield spreads, which is confirmed by the negative sign of 
the estimated coefficient in front of this variable, observed in our sample of 
countries. 
Coefficients in front of the variables public debt/GDP, fiscal position/GDP, and 
external debt/exports have the expected positive signs, indicating a positive 
relationship with yield spreads. The deterioration of the fiscal position of a 
country and an increase of its public and external debt increases the probability 
of a possible failure in the settlement of the country’s obligations, which is 
reflected in the growth of yield spreads on its debt securities. 
The external global indicator of the increase in systemic risk, the implied 
volatility index SP500_vix, proved to be statistically significant. The growth of 
this indicator causes the growth of yield spreads as a response to an increase in 
systemic risk on a global level. This logic is confirmed by the estimated 
coefficient in front of the variable with a positive sign. 
The specifications (2) and (3) have confirmed the findings of the FE model (1). 
In the next step we want to test the significance of the aggregate currency 
mismatch variables, as more comprehensive indicators of the worsening of 
countries’ macroeconomic parameters that lead to the growth of risk and, in the 
extreme case, to default. 
If we replace the explanatory variables (Public debt/GDP, fiscal position/GDP, 
and external debt/exports) that influence the currency and an overall 
misbalance on the macro level with indicators of currency mismatch, first by 
AECM and then by AECM_COR, we recognize the importance of these 
indicators in explaining the movement of yield spreads and countries’ risk of 
default. The higher the currency mismatch (presented by more negative values 
of AECM and AECM_COR measures), the greater the yield spreads as 
indicators of risk on the macro level of the observed countries. 
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GLS specification that takes into account the confirmed correlation between the 
residuals of different observation units and heteroskedasticity in the panel are 
estimated. 
Table 5.  Estimated panel specifications for the dependent variable log_EMBI 
with included measure of the aggregate currency mismatch (AECM) 
on a sample of five countries in the period 2001-2012 
Dependent variable 
log_EMBI 
    
 (1) 
FE model 
(2) 
FE model with 
robust standard 
errors 
(3) 
FE_GLS 
(correlation of residuals 
between observation units 
and heteroskedasticity 
taken into accoount) 
Growth rate of the 
real GDP  
-0,0266** 
(0,00830) 
-0,0266 
(0,0120) 
-0,0232*** 
(0,00267) 
AECM 
-0,0169*** 
(0,00367) 
-0,0169** 
(0,00313) 
-0,0168*** 
(0,00105) 
Sp500_vix 
0,0147** 
(0,00488) 
0,0147* 
(0,00384) 
0,0137*** 
(0,00191) 
bu 
   -0,418*** 
(0,0547) 
hu 
   -1,004*** 
(0,105) 
po 
   -0,725*** 
(0,0545) 
tu 
   -0,400*** 
(0,0698) 
const 
2,049*** 
(0,127) 
2,049*** 
(0,103) 
2,569*** 
(0,0641) 
N  60 60  60 
r
2  0,589 0,589   
r
2_o  0,0971 0,0971   
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2_b  0,147 0,147   
r
2_w  0,589 0,589   
sigma_u  0,383 0,383   
sigma_e  0,201 0,201   
rho  0,784 0,784   
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Notes:  
1. Standard errors in parentheses 
2. * p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001 
3. Dummy variables: 
bu (takes the value 1 for Bulgaria, and the value 0 for other countries) 
hu (takes the value 1 for Hungary, and the value 0 for other countries) 
po (takes the value 1 for Poland, and the value 0 for other countries) 
tu (takes the value 1 for Turkey, and the value 0 for other countries) 
ru (takes the value 1 for Russia, and the value 0 for other countries) 
The analysis was also undertaken with the corrected measure of aggregate 
currency mismatch (AECM_COR) included, which more informatively 
demonstrates the level of currency misbalances in specific markets. The main 
findings do not differ from the previous ones.
10  
On the basis of estimated specifications on a sample of five countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans we can conclude the 
following: 
  The measures of indebtedness and fiscal position of the countries included in 
the specifications influence the behaviour of government debt security yield 
spreads, in relation to the representative securities of developed countries. 
  The signs in front of the estimated coefficients of the observed explanatory 
variables follow economic logic. The worsening of the budgetary position of 
the country, the increase of its public and external debt, increases the 
probability of the country defaulting or being unable to meet its obligations. 
When these obligations are denominated in foreign currency, which is also 
the specificity of dual currency systems, it is impossible to ignore the 
connection between the increase in demand for foreign currency, the pass-
                                                 
10   Due to the extensiveness of the findings they are available from the authors on request. 
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increase demand for foreign currency, and negative repercussions for local 
financial stability and economic growth. The negative consequences for 
economic growth further increase the risk of the country’s default and yield 
spreads are being perceived as indicators of that probability by market 
transactors. 
  The worsening of external macro factors, in this context presented by 
S&P500 volatility index VIX, leads to an increase in yield spreads as 
indicators of default risk. 
  By substituting indicators of the fiscal position and indebtedness with the 
aggregate and the corrected aggregate measure of currency mismatch, the 
explanatory power of these aggregate indicators for the behaviour of yields 
on government debt securities has been confirmed. The new model also 
confirms the robustness of the basic model. The increase of negative 
currency mismatch leads to the growth of macro risks, reflected in the 
increase of yield spreads on government securities. 
  Due to the fact that all estimated specifications are in log-linear form, 
estimated coefficients are interpreted as follows: the slope coefficients in 
front of the regressor indicate the relative (%) change in the dependent 
variable Y with respect to the absolute change in explanatory variable X; i.e., 
with growth of X for one unit, Y is changed on average by 100%*β.  
The presented analysis was also repeated on the broader sample of seven 
countries’ (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine) data for 
the period 2005-2012.
11  
The conclusions based on a sample of seven countries do not differ substantially 
from the conclusions of the previous analysis on a sample of five countries, 
representing a specific robustness check for the estimated models. The 
estimated coefficients in front of the aggregate indicators of currency mismatch 
confirm the significance of these measures in explaining the behaviour of yield 
spreads as indicators of the analyzed countries’ default risk. 
                                                 
11   The results of the estimations and all relevant tests are available from the authors. 
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The presented analysis on samples of five and seven developing countries from 
the regions of Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans is, to the 
authors' knowledge, so far unique for this region, and thus is potentially very 
significant. It is important to point out that the authors have, for the first time, 
calculated the aggregate indicators of currency mismatch for nine additional 
countries, in comparison to the existing base of BIS.  
The aim of the empirical analysis was to demonstrate, taking into account the 
standard explanatory factors for the behaviour of yield spreads on government 
securities, that the additional indicators of financial fragility are essential when 
analyzing the sensitivity of developing countries to depreciation of local 
currencies. The analysis of yield spreads through panel models allowed 
comparison of the results of specifications that have taken into account the 
relevant fundamental and external explanatory factors for the movement of 
spreads with specifications that include aggregate measures of currency 
mismatch. 
The analysis shows that aggregate currency mismatch and corrected aggregate 
currency mismatch measures are important and useful indicators that show in a 
comprehensive way the effect of important macroeconomic variables that may 
be the cause of both stability and significant disturbances at the macro level of a 
country. In this case, in the analyzed samples of developing countries, currency 
mismatch measures have been observed instead of individual indicators of 
budgetary position and indebtedness. It turned out that mismatch indicators are 
negatively correlated with yield spreads, confirming the logic that a higher level 
of debt, especially when the debt is in foreign currency while the country 
generates revenues in local currency, leads to an increase in the probability of 
default, and the increase in yield spreads indicates that probability. 
Indicators of currency mismatch are not only significant for the observed group 
of countries but also for each specific country individually. This is particularly 
true for countries with dual currency systems (with a high level of dollarization). 
These countries face the amplifying negative affect of depreciation on financial 
stability and economic growth because of the often significant pass-through 
effect of depreciation on domestic price levels, with further accelerated 
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109depreciation impact. The currency crises in these countries are usually followed 
by crises in the banking sector and/or balance of payment crises. These aspects 
of the problem represent fruitful areas for further research. 
Due to the significance of the analyzed problem, policy makers in developing 
countries, including Serbia, should regularly calculate and publish the level of 
currency mismatch, as one of the initial steps in the fight against currency 
misbalance at the macro level and the level of all relevant sectors of the 
economy.  
The presented analysis confirms the usefulness of currency mismatch indicators 
in a series of presented and possible additional empirical analyses of the 
financial sensitivity of developing countries. 
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Table A.1. Description of variables and data sources - dependent variable and 
fundamental factors 
Variable Description Unit Frequency Source 
EMBI Global 
spreds 
Yield spreads in the 
secondary market 
expresed as a premium 
above the yields on U.S. 
Treasury securities of 
the same maturity 
Basis 
point 
Annual 
(Average 
of daily 
values over 
years) 
Bloomberg 
The growth 
rate of real 
GDP 
Annual changes of real 
GDP 
Percent Annual World Economic 
Outlook Database 
Balance of 
payments 
current 
account/GDP 
It covers transactions in 
goods, services, income 
and current transfers 
between the concrete 
economy and the rest 
of the world 
Percent Annual World Economic 
Outlook Database 
Public 
debt/GDP 
Public debt of a country 
to GDP value 
Percent Annual World Economic 
Outlook Database 
Fiscal 
position/GDP 
Budgetary position
(surplus/deficit) to 
GDP 
Percent Annual World Economic 
Outlook Database 
External 
debt/exports 
Total external debt to
non-residents is the 
sum of public, publicly 
guaranteed, and private 
non-guaranteed long-
term debt, use of IMF 
loans and short-term 
debt (maturity less than 
one year and the 
accrued interest on 
long-term debt during 
that period). 
Percent Annual The World Bank, 
International debt 
Statistics, 
http://data.worldb
ank.org 
UNCTAD 
database 
Source: Authors’ presentation of variables and data sources 
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113Table A.2. Description of variables and data sources - indicators of liquidity 
Inflation rate The annual changes in
the average level of 
consumer prices 
presented by 
Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) 
Percent Annual World Economic 
Outlook Database 
Exports/GDP The value of exported 
goods and services to 
the value of GDP  
Percent Annual http://data.worldba
nk.org 
World Economic 
Outlook Database, 
UNCTAD database 
Short-term 
external 
debt/GDP 
Short-term external
debt with maturity of 
one year or less. 
Includes public and 
private debt without 
state guarantees 
regarded in relation to 
GDP 
Percent Annual The World Bank, 
International debt 
Statistics 
http://data.worldba
nk.org 
World Economic 
Outlook Database  
International
Reserves/external 
debt 
International reserves 
in relation to the total 
level of external debt  
Percent Annual The World Bank, 
International debt 
Statistics 
External debt
service/GDP  
External debt service 
against the value of 
exports of goods, 
services and primary 
income. Debt service 
includes payments of 
the principal and 
interest on long-term 
debt in money, goods 
or services, as well as 
interest on short-term 
debt and payments to 
the IMF.  
Percent Annual The World Bank, 
International debt 
Statistics 
Source: Authors’ presentation of variables and data sources 
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3m-LIBOR 
(usd) 
The interest rate at which 
banks offer each other 
money for borrowing in 
the London interbank 
market.  
Percent Annual 
rate 
Eurostat 
3m-T-bill 
rate 
The rate of return on
three-month US 
Treasury bills. 
Percent Annual 
rate 
http://www.treas
ury.gov 
VIX  Volatility index Index 
points 
Annual 
averages 
CBOE
S&P500  Index that tracks the 
movement of the market 
value of 500 actively 
traded stocks of the most 
valuable companies in 
the U.S. market 
Index 
points 
Annual 
averages 
NYSE
Brent oil 
prices on 
the world 
market 
 USD Annual Bloomberg 
Source: Authors’ presentation of variables and data sources 
Table A.4. Description of variables and data sources - indicators of aggregate 
currency mismatch 
AECM  Aggregate effective 
currency mismatch 
indicator 
Percent  Annual Author’s calculation 
based on data from BIS, 
IMF’s International 
Financial statistics 
Yearbook, and UNCTAD 
database 
AECM_COR Corrected 
aggregate effective 
currency mismatch 
indicator 
Percent  Annual Author’s calculation 
based on data from BIS, 
IMF’s International 
Financial statistics 
Yearbook, and UNCTAD 
database 
Source: Authors’ presentation of variables and data sources 
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115Table A.5. Aggregate measure of currency mismatch for 10 countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe in the BIS database (AECM), in % 
  Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Russia Turkey 
2001 -13.30  6.50  0.20  -9.50  3.20  -1.30  4.60  -10.80  -3.80 -18.40 
2002  2.30  7.50  -3.20  -8.30  -0.10 -0.80  3.70  -13.80  -1.40 -18.70 
2003 5.50  6.70  -9.30  -7.60  -3.00 -2.40  2.00  -3.10  3.30 -15.10 
2004  6.20  6.80  -9.00  -8.30  -8.30 -5.70  2.50  1.70  12.00 -11.10 
2005  8.70  7.90  -7.80  -11.50 -16.30 -9.30  0.20  -7.00  21.70 -9.00 
2006  8.90  5.80  -14.60 -13.70 -30.50 -20.00  -1.50  0.60  30.00 -8.30 
2007  6.40  4.90  -21.20 -16.30 -49.10 -31.10  -3.20  -10.40  35.60 -7.60 
2008 -2.80  3.10  -19.60 -21.10 -55.30 -30.10  -5.70  -17.30  27.50 -7.90 
2009 -1.10  3.30  -17.50 -25.00 -48.10 -39.30  -8.10  -24.30  37.70 -8.00 
2010  2.60  2.30  -8.70  -15.80 -27.40 -25.80  -6.60  -20.00  26.80 -9.50 
2011  4.70  1.50  -6.30  -11.00 -13.20 -17.80  -5.10  -16.00  20.30 -10.40 
2012 6.70  1.70  -7.80  -8.10 -12.60 -14.60  -4.80  -17.40 17.80 -9.80 
Source: BIS 
Note: AECM = (NFCA/XGS)*FC%TD if AECM<0 and AECM = (NFCA/MGS)* FC%TD if 
AECM>0; assuming that the share of domestic debt in foreign currency is equal to 0. 
Table A.6. Corrected aggregate measure of currency mismatch for 10 countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe in the BIS database (AECM_COR), in % 
  Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary  Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Russia Turkey 
2001 -13.30  10.00  0.20  -13.80  4.00  -2.20  10.90  -10.80  -3.80 -42.00 
2002 2.60  10.80  -3.20 -12.90 -0.10  -1.30  8.10  -13.80 -1.40  -45.50 
2003 8.20  9.50  -20.60 -11.80  -6.90  -3.80  3.70  -3.10  3.40 -32.10 
2004 10.30  9.10  -16.90 -13.40  -19.20 -9.50  4.10  1.70  12.70 -20.90 
2005 16.70  10.00  -14.80 -18.10  -36.00 -17.20  0.30  -7.00  22.60 -14.60 
2006 14.90  7.40  -29.80 -21.30  -66.20 -30.80  -2.30  0.60  30.90 -11.90 
2007 11.10  6.00  -43.10 -27.20 -104.70 -48.60  -5.00  -10.40  36.20 -10.40 
2008  -4.90  3.90  -40.70 -34.90 -113.70 -50.90  -9.90  -17.30  27.70 -10.50 
2009 -2.00  4.20  -40.50 -40.30 -101.10 -67.40  -13.60 -24.30  38.00 -11.50 
2010 5.40  2.90  -22.20 -27.00 -60.80 -44.70  -11.10 -20.00  27.10 -15.50 
2011 11.40  1.90  -6.50  -18.40  -32.60 -30.80  -8.70  -16.00  20.30 -17.00 
2012 16.40  2.10  -8.30  -13.70  -27.00 -25.40  -8.00  -17.40  17.80 -15.90 
Source: BIS 
Note: AECM_COR = (NFCA/XGS)*FC%TD_COR if AECM_COR<0 and AECM_COR = 
(NFCA/MGS)*FC%TD_COR if AECM_COR>0. 
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Economic Annals, Volume LIX, No. 201 / April – June 2014Table A.7. Aggregate measure of currency mismatch for 9 additional countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe and Western Balkans (AECM), in % 
  Albania  B&H Croatia FYR Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine 
2000 11.57  -8.50 -44.03 17.83 -47.98 -38.51 -22.82  -8.24 
2001 12.83 12.06 -25.24 42.15 -24.56 -11.68 -15.03  -2.05 
2002 11.08  3.66 -41.27 24.94 15.35 -1.82 -16.47  -0.97 
2003 7.49  0.04 -55.07 25.35 10.73 -2.77 -22.93  -1.10 
2004 10.06  1.11 -66.47 17.79 2.08 -6.71 -24.25  -2.69 
2005 7.89  -0.89 -107.94 20.87 -15.51 -11.29 -48.04  -3.89 
2006 8.13  3.54 -145.12 21.43 -13.59 -14.27 -69.44 -19.16 
2007 8.51  7.33 -186.04 14.30 -18.81 -31.79 -18.07 -83.12 -26.78 
2008 3.42 -20.44 -239.94 6.25 -89.39 -85.61 -28.12 -108.98 -42.29 
2009 -4.13 -32.24 -281.53 4.92 -32.45 -96.04 -29.10 -138.73 -47.98 
2010 1.07 -12.79 -238.04 4.49 -112.24 -69.61 -29.15 -124.78 -22.72 
2011 3.81  -9.92 -217.75 3.16 -123.20 -59.37 -32.59 -109.02 -17.01 
2012 9.30 -16.63 -190.13 2.00 -155.64 -46.69 -32.73 -97.88 -16.48 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the BIS, IMF, WB, UNCTAD data and national sources 
Note: AECM = (NFCA/XGS)*FC%TD if AECM<0 and AECM = (NFCA/MGS)*FC%TD if 
AECM>0; assuming that the share of domestic debt in foreign currency is equal to 0. 
Table A.8. Corrected aggregate measure of currency mismatch for 9 additional 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Western Balkans 
(AECM_COR), in % 
  Albania B&H Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine 
2000 11.57  -8.50 -44.03 17.83 -88.01 -38.51 -22.82  -8.24 
2001 12.83  12.06 -25.24 42.15 -62.60 -11.68 -15.03  -2.05 
2002 11.08  3.66 -41.27 24.94 33.98 -1.82 -16.47  -0.97 
2003 7.49  0.04 -55.07 25.35 25.39 -2.77 -22.93  -1.10 
2004 10.06  1.11 -66.47 17.79 3.75 -6.71 -24.25  -2.69 
2005 7.89  -0.89 -107.94 20.87 -21.79 -11.29 -48.04  -3.89 
2006 8.13  3.54 -145.12 21.43 -17.12 -14.27 -69.44 -19.16 
2007 8.51  7.33 -186.04 14.30 -18.81 -41.55 -18.07 -83.12 -26.78 
2008 3.42 -20.44 -239.94 6.25 -89.39 -107.52 -28.12 -108.98 -42.29 
2009 -4.13 -32.24 -281.53 4.92 -32.45 -124.10 -29.10 -138.73 -47.98 
2010 1.07 -12.79 -238.04 4.49 -112.24 -93.63 -29.15 -124.78 -22.72 
2011 3.81  -9.92 -217.75 3.16 -123.20 -78.30 -32.59 -109.02 -17.01 
2012 9.30 -16.63 -190.13 2.00 -155.64 -65.72 -32.73 -97.88 -16.48 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the BIS, IMF, WB, UNCTAD data and national sources 
Note: AECM_COR = (NFCA/XGS)*FC%TD_COR if AECM_COR<0 and AECM_COR = 
(NFCA/MGS)*FC%TD_COR if AECM_COR>0. 
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117Figure A.1.  EMBI spreads for selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Western Balkans 
 
Source: Authors’ presentation based on Bloomberg’s data 
Table A.9. Detailed presentation of variations of the regressors over time within 
and between units of observation (country) 
Variable      
Mean Stanard 
deviation 
Min. Max.
   Observations 
                   
Country number   Overall  3  1.426148  1  5    N = 60 
    Between   1.581139  1  5    n = 5 
    Within    0  3  3    T = 12 
embi    Overall  260.2973  199.8906  24.1  934.35    N = 60 
    Between   108.825  139.9042  404.145    n = 5 
    Within    174.1303  42.32066  865.6106    T = 12 
log_embi    Overall  2.288  0.3557365  1.38  2.97    N = 60 
    Between   0.2213034  2.043333  2.555    n = 5 
    Within    0.2944558  1.624667  2.934667    T = 12 
Growth rate of the 
real GDP 
  Overall  3.637667  3.841703  -7.8  9.4    N = 60 
    Between   1.175457  1.683333  4.755    n = 5 
    Within    3.692504  -8.917334  8.737666    T = 12 
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  Overall  8.442667  9.019633  0.8  54.25    N = 60 
    Between   5.606137  2.969167  16.6925    n = 5 
    Within    7.468909  -1.999833  46.00017    T = 12 
Balance of 
payments current 
account/GDP 
  Overall  -2.880167  7.211895  -25.2  11.07    N = 60 
    Between   6.12126  -8.868333  7.49    n = 5 
    Within    4.639775  -19.21183  6.928167    T = 12 
Public debt/GDP 
  Overall  43.26317  21.32369  7.88  81.31    N = 60 
    Between   19.07365  18.86917  67.43833    n = 5 
    Within    12.59856  28.2315  81.8715    T = 12 
Fiscal 
position/GDP 
  Overall  -2.501  5.322289  -23.9  8.33    N = 60 
    Between   3.700124  -5.5325  2.555833    n = 5 
    Within    4.145888  -20.8685  6.660667    T = 12 
External 
debt/Exports    Overall  138.511  34.80216  85.32  226.23    N = 60 
    Between   27.60359  103.0592  180.1133    n = 5 
    Within    24.3165  93.84767  225.1268    T = 12 
Exports/GDP    Overall  45.1185  20.03306  21  94.66    N = 60 
    Between   20.86138  23.705  76.47167    n = 5 
    Within    6.874923  29.64683  63.30684    T = 12 
Short-term 
external debt/GDP 
  Overall  13.11983  8.525885  3.55  38.25    N = 60 
    Between   7.222114  4.846667  23.00333    n = 5 
    Within    5.500576  -1.0935  28.3665    T = 12 
International 
reserves/External 
debt    Overall  38.106  21.72739  15.71  99.06    N = 60 
    Between   19.60705  23.23583  71.27833    n = 5 
    Within    12.62211  -10.11233  65.88766    T = 12 
External debt
service/GDP 
  Overall  10.0375  5.217186  3.25  22.43    N = 60 
    Between   3.99239  4.273333  13.80583    n = 5 
    Within    3.775124  3.111667  18.67917    T = 12 
3m LIBOR (usd) 
  Overall  2.264167  1.774974  0.34  5.3    N = 60 
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119    Between   0  2.264167  2.264167    n = 5 
    Within    1.774974  0.34  5.3    T = 12 
3m LIBOR (eur)
  Overall  2.515833  1.350998  0.57  4.63    N = 60 
    Between   0  2.515833  2.515833    n = 5 
    Within    1.350998  0.57  4.63    T = 12 
3m-T-bill rate 
  Overall  1.783333  1.645056  0.05  4.73    N = 60 
    Between   0  1.783333  1.783333    n = 5 
    Within    1.645056  0.05  4.73    T = 12 
Sp500_vix    Overall  21.86583  6.510219  12.81  32.69    N = 60 
    Between   0  21.86583  21.86583    n = 5 
    Within    6.510219  12.81  32.69    T = 12 
Sp500    Overall  1186.159  157.6937  948.05  1477.18    N = 60 
    Between   0  1186.159  1186.159    n = 5 
    Within    157.6937  948.05  1477.18    T = 12 
Brent_oil 
  Overall  64.25917  30.58699  24.42  111.97    N = 60 
    Between   0  64.25917  64.25917    n = 5 
    Within    30.58699  24.42  111.97    T = 12 
Aecm    Overall  -0.8283334 13.78823  -25  37.7    N = 60 
    Between   12.85997  -13.01667  18.95833    n = 5 
    Within    7.45452  -23.58667  17.91333    T = 12 
Aecm_cor    Overall  -3.73  18.91845  -45.5  38    N = 60 
    Between   17.46913  -21.06667  19.29167    n = 5 
    Within    10.47061  -28.58  14.97833    T = 12 
t    Overall  6.5  3.481184  1  12    N = 60 
    Between   0  6.5  6.5    n = 5 
    Within    3.481184  1  12    T = 12 
EU member    Overall  0.3833333  0.4903014  0  1    N = 60 
    Between   0.3754627  0  0.75    n = 5 
    Within    0.3545507  -0.3666667 0.9666667   T = 12 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
120
Economic Annals, Volume LIX, No. 201 / April – June 2014Table A.10. Descriptive statistics for variables EMBI and log_EMBI 
  embi Log_embi 
N 60 60 
Arithmetic mean  260,2973 2,288 
Standard deviation  199,8906 0,3557365 
Skewness coefficient  1,541122 -0,4055467 
Kurtosis coefficient  5,490419 2,72407 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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